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DIVINE SATISFICING AND THE ETHICS OF
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
Chris Tucker

This paper accomplishes three goals. First, it reveals that God’s ethics has a
radical satisficing structure: God can choose a good enough suboptimal option
even if there is a best option and no countervailing considerations. Second, it
resolves the long-standing worry that there is no account of the good enough
that is both principled and demanding enough to be good enough. Third, it
vindicates the key ethical assumption in the problem of evil without relying
on the contested assumption that God’s ethics is our ethics (on steroids).

1. Introduction
No one expects God’s ethics to have a satisficing structure, a structure
which makes it rational, in the absence of countervailing considerations,
to reject the better for the good enough. Satisficing, in this narrow sense,
is rarely thought to apply to human ethics.1 It is especially controversial
whether it applies to divine ethics. For an absolutely perfect God might
be expected to go above and beyond the call of duty, to always choose the
best in the absence of countervailing considerations.2 I reject these sensible
expectations. I argue that God’s ethics has a satisficing structure.
Indeed, I argue that God’s ethics has a particular satisficing structure: in
the absence of countervailing considerations, God must make each creature’s life fully good but not necessarily maximally good. A creature’s life is
fully good when, roughly, it has all the goodness that it ought to have. The
notion of full goodness is crucial. It underwrites the positive arguments
that I offer on behalf of satisficing. It also resolves a longstanding worry
about satisficing structures. For no other account of the good enough is both
principled and demanding enough to be good enough.
This paper has direct relevance to the argument from evil. Standard
formulations of the argument appeal to something like this conjunction:

1
See §3 for a discussion of how this conception of satisficing relates to the broader
literature.
2
See, e.g., Kraay, “Can God Satisfice?” 404–405.
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Ethical Premise: God necessarily prevents suffering in the absence of
sufficiently strong countervailing considerations, and
Empirical Premise: There exists some suffering for which God would
not have a sufficiently strong countervailing
consideration.
Together these premises entail that something exists—suffering in the
absence of sufficiently strong countervailing considerations—which necessarily doesn’t exist if God exists. So God doesn’t exist. Recent literature
on the argument from evil, including the literature on skeptical theism,
tends to focus on whether the empirical premise is true or reasonable. To
the extent that the ethical premise has been defended at all, it is defended
by the following sort of analogical reasoning: excellent human beings prevent suffering in the absence of countervailing considerations, so (an absolutely perfect) God does too. Murphy forcefully challenges this analogical
reasoning and concludes that we should reject Ethical Premise, thereby
refuting the standard arguments from evil.3
I grant Murphy’s challenge to the analogical reasoning for the sake of
argument. I vindicate Ethical Premise without assuming that God’s ethics
is our ethics or our ethics on steroids. Maximal well-being is not required
for full goodness, so God does not need a countervailing consideration to
forgo elevating us to the greatest heights of well-being. Yet full goodness
does require the absence of suffering, so God does need a countervailing
consideration to allow us to descend into the depths of despair. This satisficing picture is not what we expected God’s ethics to look like. It nonetheless vindicates the ethical premise in the argument from evil.
In the next section, §2, I distinguish between requiring and merely justifying reasons and explain why the former have a special role to play in
the explanation of divine (in)action. I employ the requiring/merely justifying distinction in §3, where I clarify what it is for God’s reasons to have
a satisficing structure and distinguish that structure from its alternatives.
My arguments for divine satisficing initially assume a certain medieval
neo-Platonist axiology. The concept full goodness is most familiar in that
context (though not by that name). In addition, Murphy assumes this axiology. I give Murphy the axiology he wants and show that what follows
is a satisficing structure capable of grounding the ethical premise in the
argument from evil. In §4, I identify, clarify, and briefly defend the provisionally assumed neo-Platonism, as well as the notion of full goodness. In
§§5–6, I argue that God’s reasons have a satisficing structure. In a nutshell,
satisficing best captures—in two ways—the normative import of the difference between full goodness and deprivation, given that these concepts
are understood in the relevant neo-Platonic way.
After demonstrating that Murphy’s neo-Platonism supports divine
satisficing, I show that my arguments for divine satisficing can survive
3
See Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, especially chs. 3 and 6, and “Is an Absolutely Perfect
Being Morally Perfect?”
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without the assumption of neo-Platonism. In §7, I explain why the essential features of my arguments for divine satisficing depend only on
neo-Platonism’s commitment to the full goodness threshold; I show that
this threshold fits comfortably in other metaethical frameworks; and I provide independent grounds for endorsing the full goodness threshold. In
§8, I explain how full goodness resolves the longstanding worry that satisficing theories have no account of the good enough that is both principled
and demanding enough to be good enough.
In §9, I apply full goodness satisficing to the problem of evil and defend
its application against two concerns in the recent literature. The upshot is
that it vindicates the key ethical assumption in the problem of evil.
2. Two Kinds of Reasons
Reasons (for action) are things that contribute in a systematic way to a
given normative status, usually (ir)rationality. Rationality is “finally
authoritative in settling questions of what to do.”4 With respect to God, a
rational action is one that is worthy of being chosen by an absolutely perfect being. An irrational action is one that is not worthy of being chosen by
such a being.5 On this conception of rationality, there is no gap between an
action’s being (divinely) rational and an action’s being good enough for
God. If it is rational for God to satisfice, it is possible that God satisfices.
Thus, one worry about divine satisficing—that it might be rational without being good enough for God—is stymied right from the get-go.
Divine reasons, then, are things that make systematic contributions to
an action’s being (not) worthy of divine choice. There are two different
kinds of systematic contributions that reasons can make, which track two
different kinds of force they can have. It is standardly assumed that all reasons have justifying force, roughly, the capacity to make an act rational.6 It
is less clear whether all reasons have requiring force, roughly, the capacity
to make doing anything else irrational.7

Darwall, Impartial Reason, 215–16.
The labels “rationality” and “(ir)rational” do not matter. Just replace “rationality” with
your favorite term for the single, comprehensive normative perspective that is finally authoritative concerning questions of what God is to do. And replace “(ir)rational” with your
favorite term for what’s (not) worthy of divine choice from the relevant perspective.
6
Horgan and Timmons (“Untying a Knot from the Inside Out,” 55) are the only exception to this standard assumption that I’m aware of. In order to account for what they call
“meritorious supererogation,” they correctly hold that they must posit a third dimension of
normative force, merit-making. They incorrectly infer that merit-making force is possible in
the absence of justifying force. How can a reason have the capacity to confer merit on an act
without having the capacity to make the act rational? Hint: it can’t.
7
If something has requiring force without justifying force, I call it a coherence constraint.
I assume that nothing provides a coherence constraint for God. When theorists claim that
human beings are subject to coherence constraints, it is due to some imperfection. For example, an irrational desire to eat every rock you can find has some tendency to make it irrational
to not eat the next rock without having any tendency to make it rational to eat the rock.
4
5
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If a reason to φ has requiring force, it is a requiring reason, i.e., a reason
that both makes φ pro tanto rational and makes doing anything else pro
tanto irrational.8 Requiring reasons to φ don’t necessarily make φ required;
rather, they necessarily make it required in the absence of countervailing considerations. If a reason to φ doesn’t have requiring force, it is a merely justifying reason, i.e., a reason that pro tanto makes it rational to φ but does
not make it pro tanto irrational to do something else instead.9 Merely justifying reasons don’t necessarily make it rational to φ; rather, they necessarily make it rational to φ in the absence of countervailing considerations. So
understood, all reasons are either requiring (have justifying and requiring
force) or merely justifying (have justifying but not requiring force).
For simplicity, I follow Murphy in assuming that what God can (can’t)
do must be grounded in what God has reason to (not) do.10 Since all reasons are either requiring or merely justifying, it follows that what God
can (can’t) do must be fully accounted for by these two kinds of reasons.
Merely justifying reasons have some tendency to give God discretion in
one respect without limiting it in any respect. If God’s reason to give you
an ice cream cone is merely justifying, then, in the absence of countervailing considerations, God can give you an ice cream cone and God can do
something else instead.
Requiring reasons have some tendency to give God discretion in one
respect and some tendency to eliminate it in every other respect. If God’s
reason to prevent your suffering is requiring, then in the absence of countervailing considerations, God can prevent your suffering and God cannot
fail to do so. Consequently, requiring reasons have a special role to play in
determining the scope of what God can do. In the absence of countervailing considerations, both merely justifying and requiring reasons to φ can
explain why God can φ. Yet only requiring reasons can explain why God
can’t choose an action. If God can’t let you suffer, it is because both (a) God
has requiring reason to not let you suffer, and (b) God has no sufficiently
strong countervailing considerations. To put the same point in more positive terms: if God must choose an action (if God can’t choose any alternative), then God must have undefeated requiring reason to perform that
action. Since Ethical Premise is a premise about what God can’t do (God
can’t allow suffering in the absence of countervailing considerations), it
assumes that God always has a requiring reason to prevent suffering.
8
Pro tanto rational = rational in the absence of countervailing considerations. Pro tanto
irrational = irrational in the absence of countervailing considerations.
9
For further clarification of requiring and justifying strength, see Gert, “The Distinction
between Justifying and Requiring,” and Tucker, “How to Think about Satisficing,” 1373–1376.
10
Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, ch 2. As it stands, this simplifying assumption is too simple to be true but is close enough for the present purposes. The main complications won’t
concern us here (e.g., God’s inability to make 2 + 2 = 5 isn’t grounded in what reasons God
has, but something prior: what options God has). See Murphy’s (God’s Own Ethics, ch 2, sec
2.2) and Swinburne’s (The Coherence of Theism, 148–152) discussion of perfect rationality and
freedom for why the simplifying assumption is plausibly on the right track.
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3. The Structure of Divine Reasons: Rivals and Methodology
3.1. Three Rival Structures
This paper is concerned with the sort of reasons that an individual creature’s well-being gives God to promote that well-being. Thus, we should
set aside any reasons that God has from other sources, such as his promises or the fairness of a given distribution of well-being across people. We
are focused solely on the sort of reasons an individual’s well-being provides God to promote that well-being.
Everyone seems to agree—at least I assume—that creaturely well-being
provides God with reasons to make a creature’s life better.11 The debate is
about what structure those reasons have. One potential structure is:
No Requiring Reasons (NRR): the well-being of creatures provides
only merely justifying reasons to give a creature higher degrees of
well-being.
No Requiring Reasons holds that no matter how bad a creature’s life is,
God has no requiring reason to make the life better. If true, NRR would
refute the ethical premise in the argument from evil, which holds that God
can permit suffering only if God has a countervailing consideration. NRR
says that, even in the absence of countervailing considerations, God can
rationally ignore suffering no matter how bad it is.
The second structure holds that the well-being of creatures has some
tendency to limit what God can do, but only up to a certain point.
Satisficing Reasons (SR): God has requiring reason to promote a creature’s well-being to at least some suboptimal degree GE;12 God’s reason
to promote a creature’s well-being beyond GE are merely justifying.
GE is whatever degree counts as “the good enough.” Below GE is not
good enough and above GE is more than enough. Satisficing Reasons
limits what God can do below GE, because God needs a countervailing
consideration to allow a creature to have less well-being than GE. SR does
not limit what God can do above GE, because God does not need a countervailing consideration to allow the creature to enjoy less than a maximal
degree of well-being. The version of SR that I defend takes a stand on
what GE is, namely GE = being fully good (both for the whole life and
every part of it13). We can call the resulting version of SR, SR*. God has
To deny this assumption is to deny that considerations such as it would be better for the
creature provide any reason or rationale at all for God to prefer one situation over another.
Such a denial seems implausible (though, it would be controversial to say that all God’s reasons have that form). It’s also worth mentioning that Ethical Premise in the argument from
evil takes for granted that God always has a (requiring) reason, at the very least, to make a
suffering creature better off.
12
For our purposes, we can say that a degree of well-being is suboptimal for creatures of
kind K iff creatures of that kind can generally have some higher degree of well-being.
13
It may seem overkill to hold that the good enough is full goodness for the whole life and
every part of it. Recall, though, that I’m trying to vindicate Ethical Premise. A life might be
11
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requiring reason to ensure that (parts of) lives are at least fully good—
which is enough to get the argument from evil up and running—but only
merely justifying reasons to ensure that (parts of) lives are even better.
We’ll clarify full goodness in the next section.
The third structure is:
Just Requiring Reasons (JRR): for every higher degree of well-being
that God could bring about, God has requiring reason to bring about
that higher degree.
JRR is compatible with God’s giving a creature a suboptimal degree of
well-being, i.e., less well-being than God could have given that creature.
If God can make a creature’s life better than W, God still might give the
creature W if God has a countervailing consideration, e.g., if someone’s
freedom would have to be violated to give the creature more than W. The
“JRR Conjunction” is JRR plus the view that sometimes there are countervailing considerations strong enough to justify giving a creature some
suboptimal degree of well-being.14
No Requiring Reasons, Satisficing Reasons, and Just Requiring Reasons
are pairwise incompatible. NRR holds that God has no requiring reasons
to promote creaturely well-being at all. SR claims that God has requiring reason to promote creaturely well-being up to a certain (suboptimal)
point, the good enough, and only merely justifying reason beyond that
point. JRR holds that God has requiring reason to make a creature’s life
better as long as God can make the creature’s life better.
Let me briefly indicate how JRR, SR(*), and NRR are related to the broader
debate about satisficing. These theses are focused solely on God’s reasons
to promote a certain good, namely a creature’s well-being. Analogs of these
theses could be constructed for any good. For example, consider the value
of the world and the reasons it provides God to promote that value. The
value of the world might never provide a requiring reason for God to make
the world better (NRRW), it might provide a requiring reason only up to a
certain point (SRW), or it might provide a requiring reason as long as God
can make the world better (JRRW). In principle, a satisficing structure might
apply to God’s reasons to promote creaturely well-being without applying
to God’s reason to promote the overall value of the world.
When philosophers argue that some satisficing theory is true, they usually aim to defend little more than this claim: for some good, some agent can
rationally reject the better for the less good. This claim is compatible with
good on the whole even though it contains some instance of suffering. If God has requiring
reason to prevent every instance of suffering, as Ethical Premise supposes, then God must
have requiring reason to make every part of the life fully good. This demanding account of
the good enough is also what follows from the arguments I give later in the paper.
14
The “Just Requiring Reasons” part of the JRR Conjunction applies only to the sort of reasons creaturely well-being provides God to promote that well-being. The JRR Conjunction
is compatible with merely justifying reasons (e.g. a prerogative) serving as a countervailing
consideration that makes it rational for God to choose a suboptimal degree of well-being.
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all three rival structures. I am using “satisficing theories” more narrowly to
apply to the structure involved in SR and SRW.15 Those who defend something under the label of “satisficing theory” almost always have something
like the JRR Conjunction structure in mind.16 They think, for example, that
God has requiring reason to make the world better as long as God can make
it better; however, they add that God has some countervailing consideration
that makes it all-in rational to reject better worlds for less good worlds.17
Let’s return to our focus on God’s reasons to promote creaturely well-being. Murphy clearly endorses NRR, and many others apparently do so as
well.18 The JRR Conjunction is the standard way to account for how God
can rationally reject the better for the less good. Until now, it’s not clear
that anyone has been foolish enough to defend SR, much less SR*. And
this paper may reveal, ironically, that it is divine ethics, not human ethics,
that is more apt to have a satisficing structure.
3.2. Methodological Considerations
You might have noticed that Murphy’s view seems prima facie absurd.
Consider two similar worlds, W1 and W2. The main difference is that W1
involves neither Jim’s enjoying a certain jelly bean at a certain time nor any
holocausts, whereas W2 involves both Jim’s enjoying that jelly bean and a
holocaust. You would think that God would need a pretty powerful countervailing consideration to prefer W2 over W1; however, Murphy’s NRR
denies this. NRR claims that the badness of the holocausts provides only
merely justifying reasons, and so God can rationally ignore them in the
absence of countervailing considerations.19
15
See Tucker (“How to Think about Satisficing,” 1375-81) for a detailed clarification of
this structure and how it is different from the JRR Conjunction structure, or what I there call
“motivated submaximization theory.”
16
See Tucker, “Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization” for a defense of these claims
regarding divine ethics, and Tucker, “How to Think about Satisficing” for a defense of these
claims regarding human ethics.
17
E.g., Langtry, God, the Best, and Evil, 74–78.
18
See Murphy, “Is an Absolutely Perfect Being Morally Perfect?” and God’s Own Ethics,
ch. 4. A number of other philosophers would find NRR very attractive, if they were to agree
that the simplifying assumption from §2 is on the right track. Historically, these philosophers
include Aquinas (see Davies, The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil, especially ch. 4 and
the appendix; cf. God’s Own Ethics, ch 4, sec 4.4) and Duns Scotus (M. Adams, “Duns Scotus
on the Goodness of God”). In the contemporary scene, this includes Marilyn Adams (“Duns
Scotus on the Goodness of God,” 500; Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God, e.g. 64); Davies
(The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil, especially ch. 4 and the appendix); and Rubio (“God
Meets Satan’s Apple,” 3002–3003). Davies explicitly rejects the idea that God acts on reasons,
but he builds more into the notion of God’s acting on a reason than I do (The Reality of God
and the Problem of Evil, 215–219).
19
See Wielenberg (“Intrinsic Value and Love”) for another (alleged) counterexample along
these lines. Murphy (God’s Own Ethics, 110–116) argues that NRR avoids various objections
to skeptical theism. Yet one of Rowe’s alleged counterexamples to skeptical theism arguably
works better against NRR than skeptical theism. According to NRR, God might not even care
if human life were “nothing more than a series of agonizing moments from birth to death”
(“Skeptical Theism,” 198, emphasis removed).
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Such counterexamples, as devastating as they may first appear, fail to
directly challenge Murphy’s attack on the ethical premise in the argument
from evil. This premise is the claim that God must prevent suffering in
the absence of countervailing considerations, or alternatively, that God
has requiring reason to promote our well-being at least to the point that
we don’t suffer. To the extent that this assumption has been defended at
all, it has been defended on the further assumption that God shares our
moral reasons: since we have requiring reason to promote the well-being of others, then God does too. The problem, as Murphy points out, is
that the standard accounts of reason possession—including the standard
Kantian accounts—fail to vindicate the assumption that God shares our
moral reasons.20 Indeed, if anything, they challenge it. Our intuitions in
the jelly bean case may very well be driven by our expectation that God
shares our moral reasons; therefore, they arguably do not directly respond
to Murphy’s challenge.
Murphy shows us that the key ethical assumption in the argument
from evil needs defense.21 An adequate defense of this assumption needs
to either defend an adequate account of moral reasons possession that vindicates the key assumption, or else it needs to be plausible that the defense
isn’t just piggy-backing on undefended assumptions about the possession
of moral reasons. The rest of this paper takes the latter approach by obeying this methodological constraint: we cannot assume that the structure
of God’s (moral or non-moral) reasons is analogous to the structure of
our (moral or non-moral) reasons. The constraint is methodological, not
substantive. We aren’t assuming that the structure of divine reasons is not
analogous. It constrains where we begin, not where we end.
In addition to helping us address Murphy’s challenge, the methodological constraint also plays a useful heuristic role. It forces us to consider
other kinds of considerations beyond the familiar appeals to analogy. One
such consideration is the normative-axiological fit criterion: other things
being equal, an overall ethical theory is preferable to the extent that its
normative and axiological theories cohere or fit “tightly” together. I have
nothing fancy in mind. Indeed, we apply this criterion so naturally and
intuitively that we rarely need complicated arguments to tell when the fit
is awkward or tight. The criterion’s guiding idea is that one’s normative
and axiological theories are mutually constraining: (i) one’s normative
ethical theory constrains which axiological theories one can endorse, and
(ii) one’s axiological theory constrains which normative theories one can
endorse. My arguments for divine satisficing depend most heavily on the
latter direction, (ii), so I clarify it here.

Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, ch. 3.
You may doubt that Ethical Premise needs defense since it is already so plausible that it
is bound to be more plausible than any challenge to it, no matter how plausible the challenge
may seem at first glance. Fine. It is still interesting to consider whether Murphy’s challenge
can be answered on its own terms.
20
21

Faith and Philosophy

40

First, we expect significant qualitative axiological difference to correlate with qualitative normative difference. Suppose that an ethicist waxes
poetic about how special intrinsic dignity is. While things can have mere
intrinsic value, only persons can have intrinsic dignity, where persons necessarily have the capacity to guide their behavior in light of their conception of rational laws. If this ethicist did not accord persons special
normative treatment—e.g., that only persons have rights or that only persons can’t be used as mere means—we would worry that she has “taken
back” her claim that only persons have some special intrinsic dignity. That
is, her overall (i.e., normative + axiological) theory would be objectionably
awkward if the “intrinsic dignity” of persons failed to have normative
significance. (Of course, we may object to such a normative theory on the
grounds that animals have moral rights or whatever. That’s because one’s
normative theory also constrains one’s axiology. If the ethicist extends
rights to animals, we expect her to modify her axiology, e.g., by extending dignity to animals or by making the standards for personhood more
inclusive.)
Second, we expect the absence of qualitative axiological difference to
correlate with the absence of qualitative normative difference. Suppose that
a moral theorist holds that the only intrinsically valuable thing is pleasure,
and that the only thing that affects its value is its quantity. Nonetheless,
he claims that we have reason to promote the pleasure of people but not
the pleasure of animals, and this is because of the nature of pleasure itself
(and not because, say, that we’ve made promises to people that we haven’t
made to animals). This fit between the axiological and normative aspects
of his view seems objectionably awkward, bordering on incoherent.22
Perhaps we’ll sacrifice some awkwardness in the way our axiology fits
with our normative theory for the sake of other theoretical virtues; however, other things being equal, an overall ethical theory is preferable to the
extent that its normative and axiological positions cohere or fit “tightly”
together. In §4 and §7, I Identify and defend the axiology I’m working
with in this paper. In §5 and §6, I argue that SR* is the normative theory
that best fits this axiology.
4. Medieval Neo-Platonism
4.1. Medieval Neo-Platonism and Full Goodness
I provisionally assume medieval neo-Platonism, the axiological context in
which full goodness is most familiar (though not by that name). Murphy’s
defense of NRR relies on this axiology. I’ll give him the axiology—and the
methodological constraint—he wants and show that what follows is not

The theorist might try to ease the apparent tension by adding some additional mechanism, such as conditions (enablers, disablers) or modifiers (intensifiers, attentuators). The
point is that there is a tension and if it can’t be relieved, the overall (normative plus axiological) theory is problematic.
22
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NRR, but a satisficing structure capable of grounding the ethical premise
in the argument from evil. I’ll revisit this provisional assumption in §7.
Medieval neo-Platonism has three components.23 First, God is the only
intrinsically good thing in the sense that it is the only thing that is good
independently of its relation to anything else. Second, to the extent that
a created thing is good, it is good by participation in (or resemblance to)
divine goodness. To claim that creaturely well-being is participated goodness is to claim that its goodness consists in a certain kind of relation to
the Good. Such a claim is compatible with creaturely well-being counting
as necessarily and non-instrumentally good. Third, badness is privation,
or deprivation. It is not bad for a rock that it fails to participate in God’s
goodness through perceiving its surroundings or experiencing pleasure.
In contrast, if a human life never enjoys such things, it is to that extent a
bad human life. Badness is absence of due goodness or perfection, absence
of goodness that a thing ought to have. I assume that a creature’s nature,
function, telos, kind membership, or something of the sort determines
what goods it ought to have, though no particular account is built into
neo-Platonism.24 (The label “medieval neo-Platonism” may be misleading
insofar as the third component has obvious affinities with neo-Aristotelian accounts of what’s good/bad for a creature.)
Note that the privative view is distinct from the Augustinian claim that
badness is a mere absence of good.25 The language of due and ought is
essential. The absence of some additional good, even some additional fitting good, is not necessarily bad for the creature. Nor does it suffice for
the deprivation of the creature. Einstein could have been a little smarter,
which would have “fit” his human nature, but he wasn’t deprived with
respect to intelligence. Deprivation for a creature is absence of a good that
the creature is due or ought to have.
Full goodness is the opposite of deprivation. A creature’s life (in some
respect) is fully good iff there is some goodness it ought to have and it has
all the goodness it ought to have (in that respect). A fully good life would
be “self-sufficient” in Aristotle’s sense, at least insofar as it would be a life
that is “desirable and lacking in nothing.”26 Such a life has no badness for
the creature, because it has no deprivation.
Full goodness (in some respect) will rarely, if ever, require maximal
goodness (in that respect). Human beings ought to have some degree
23
It has been endorsed by Aquinas and Suárez (Newlands, “Leibniz on Privations,
Limitations, and the Metaphysics of Evil,” 283–285); as well as Murphy (God’s Own Ethics,
especially ch. 4). Robert Adams’s view (Finite and Infinite Goods, especially ch. 1 and 103–104)
is a close enough fit for my purposes. As I explain below—see §4.1—his alleged counterexamples seem to misunderstand the third component.
24
I also assume that God has, at most, limited voluntary control over what goods a creature ought to have. God can’t make it false that human beings ought to have pleasure or
friendships any more than God can make it false that 2 + 2 = 4 or that torturing humans for
fun is morally wrong.
25
Newlands, “Leibniz on Privations, Limitations, and the Metaphysics of Evil.”
26
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk I.7.
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of intelligence, but a human being isn’t deprived if she fails to be three
times smarter than Einstein. Perhaps a human being ought to have at least
one unit of pleasure each moment. More pleasure is presumably better,
but a human being is not deprived if she fails to have an infinite amount
of pleasure each moment. Consequently, some fully good lives are better than others. A fully good life with 10 units of pleasure per moment
is better, other things being equal, than a fully good life with 1 unit per
moment.27
According to my version of Satisficing Reasons, SR*, full goodness sets
the threshold for the good enough. God has requiring reason to make each
creature’s life (in every respect) fully good, but only merely justifying reasons to make it even better. For example, God has requiring reason to give
human beings whatever degree of intelligence is required for full goodness and only merely justifying reason to give a human being more than
this degree of intelligence.28
My positive arguments for satisficing depend most heavily on the third
component, because that’s the component that gives us full goodness. Yet
the third component is easily misunderstood. Suppose that pain is necessarily bad for humans. It is necessarily bad, on the privative view, because
having pain is incompatible with full goodness. It does not follow that
pain is somehow nothing or an absence or that pain qua pain is a privation.29 Even if pain is just a certain kind of phenomenal character of experience, its badness for a creature might consist in depriving that creature of
some other mental state that the creature ought to be in (e.g., a uniformly
pleasant phenomenal character).30 We must distinguish what pain is in
27
Some non-fully good lives, or lives with some deprivation, are also better than some
fully good ones. Consider a fully good life. Now consider a second life exactly the same
except that it contains both a painful pinprick and 1,000 additional units of pleasure. The
latter seems better despite having some deprivation. This possibility raises a question for my
satisficing view. I hold that God needs a countervailing consideration to prefer a non-fully
good life over a fully good one. But what if the non-fully good life is better than the fully
good one? In that case, the greater quality of the non-fully good life seems to justify God
in choosing it. God doesn’t need a countervailing consideration to forgo additional good
beyond full goodness. God does need a countervailing consideration to allow deprivation
into a life, but the high quality of the creature’s life can itself provide the needed countervailing consideration, at least in cases in which the non-fully good life is better than the fully
good alternatives. And it goes without saying that my satisficing view (and its rivals, NRR
and JRR) allow that God might have countervailing considerations grounded in something
besides well-being that affect his reasons to give a creature a certain amount of well-being
(fairness of welfare distributions across people, past promises, etc.).
28
For simplicity, I assume that, if a creature ought to have some degree of a good (e.g.
intelligence), it is always better for the creature to have more of that good. All I really need for
a satisficing picture is that it is sometimes better to have more of that good beyond what is due.
29
Robert Adams’s (Finite and Infinite Goods, 103) and at least some of Adam Swenson’s
(“Privation Theories of Pain”) objections seem to miss this point.
30
Of course, some pains are also good in a way (cf. Anglin and Goetz, “Evil is Privation,”
5–6). If your finger is touching a burner, it is good that you feel pain and it would be bad if
you didn’t feel it. Given that something bad is happening to you, it might be good that you suffer
pain. It doesn’t follow that it is good for you to suffer pain (full stop, without qualification).
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itself from the question of what makes pain bad (for the creature). The
privative view, as I understand it here, addresses only the latter question.
After I show that Murphy’s neo-Platonism supports SR* rather than his
NRR, I will drop some of its details (e.g., the claim that all badness is privative). In the next sub-section, I clarify the features of the third component
that are most central to my arguments for SR*.
4.2. Medieval Neo-Platonism and the Structure of Axiological Reality
A natural assumption is that axiological reality is structured solely by
which goods (bads) exist and whether things are better, worse, or equally
good with respect to those goods (bads). Chang objects that this natural
assumption fails to capture all true quantitative comparisons between
comparable goods.31 She introduces a fourth comparative. A might be
comparable to B even though A isn’t better than, worse than, or equally
good as B. For A and B might be on a par.
Like Chang, the proponent of full goodness holds that the natural
assumption fails to capture all the structure in axiological reality. In contrast to Chang, the proponent of full goodness is not adding another comparative and is not concerned with enriching the structure of quantitative
comparisons. The full goodness threshold is qualitative. Every 50 unit
increase of pleasure might be equally good, but not every failure to acquire
50 units of pleasure counts as deprivation. Indeed, 10 units of pleasure
for you is less valuable than 100 units of pleasure for me. Yet if my life is
already full of pleasure and yours isn’t, then you might be deprived by
missing out on those 10 units even though I won’t be deprived by missing
out on those 100 units. Human beings can be better, worse, equally good,
and perhaps on a par in various respects; however, they also “have to
have” certain goods in certain amounts. Or, in the more common parlance,
there are certain goods human beings ought to have or are due.32
“Ought” and “due” have different connotations, but they both pick out
something like an axiological—rather than a normative—requirement.
(Actually, they often pick out a pro tanto axiological requirement, but we
can ignore this refinement until the next section.) Such things are sometimes referred to as “impersonal oughts,” or what something ought to be,
in contrast to “personal oughts,” or what one ought to do.33 So understood,
the phrase “goods a creature ought to have (is due)” is not synonymous
with “goods appropriate to a creature’s kind.” Goods can be appropriate
Chang, “The Possibility of Parity.”
If you aren’t convinced yet that the full goodness threshold is qualitative rather than
quantitative, we can anticipate the discussion in §7. Simple hedonists claim that there is only
one bad, pain. The proponent of full goodness objects that there is a distinct kind of bad, not
reducible to pain, namely the failure to have all the pleasure that one ought to have. Which
bads exist seems to be a qualitative, not a quantitative, issue.
33
Sometimes philosophers use “ought” to refer to ideals rather than requirements. But
in this paper I am concerned with the requirement sense of “ought,” whether personal or
impersonal.
31
32
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for a creature without being axiologically required, without the creature
being deprived without them. More intelligence would have fit Einstein,
but he wasn’t deprived without it.
Some philosophers may reject the existence of impersonal oughts, and
so may reject the particular way in which full goodness enriches axiological reality. In §7, I provide an argument for the full goodness threshold
that is independent of neo-Platonism. That argument just is an argument
that there are impersonal oughts associated with the goods a human
ought to have.
The third component, in my hands anyway, treats this additional axiological structure in a typical functionalist way, using three concepts that
are defined in terms of each other. Something is deprived when it doesn’t
have all the goods it ought to have (is due). The goods it ought to have (is
due) are those goods it is deprived without. Something is fully good iff it
has all the goods it ought to have (and there are goods it ought to have).34
So these three concepts are a package deal: nothing can be deprived unless
it can be fully good and there are some goods it ought to have (is due).35
To be deprived is to be deprived of something. It is to be deprived of full
goodness, of all the goods that you ought to have.
These functionalist definitions would leave you in the dark if you didn’t
already have some independent grip on at least one of the terms. But I’m
betting you have an independent grip on both deprivation and the goods a
thing is due or ought to have. You recognize that an absence of sight is deprivation but an absence of omniscience is not. You recognize that sight is
something that a human being ought to have or is due and that omniscience is
not. We recognize, in other words, that humans are (pro tanto) axiologically
34
While I argue in this paper that full goodness is the good enough, they are conceptually distinct. Full goodness is what marks when a creature has all the goodness that it ought
to have. The good enough is what marks when the requiring reasons to promote the good
become merely justifying reasons to promote the good. The former is a meta-axiological concept, one that concerns the structure of the good. The latter is a normative concept, linking
the good to reasons for action. My argument for SR* below is roughly that once you hold
that the meta-axiological concept (full goodness) applies to creatures, you are committed to
holding that the normative concept (good enough) applies to the reasons of a divine agent.
35
A caveat may be needed if we allow that some badness is non-privative (i.e., if we reject
the full details of the third component) and also hold on to the full goodness threshold.
In such a case, perhaps something can be deprived even if it has all the goods it ought to
have, because it has some bads that it ought not have (is due not to have). Yet here again the
ought to have is important. Not all bads would be deprivations. The grotesque appearance
of one’s internal organs is no deprivation of the aesthetic goodness one ought to have, but
the grotesque appearance of one’s face arguably would be. Just as we need to distinguish
between those absences of goods which are deprivations and those that aren’t, we must
distinguish between those bads that are deprivations and those that aren’t. Thus, we’ll need
to revise our functionalist definitions as follows. Something is deprived iff it doesn’t have
all the goods it ought to have or it has some bads it ought not have. The goods it ought to
have are those goods it is deprived without. Those bads it ought not have are those bads it is
deprived if it has. Something is fully good iff it has all the goods it ought to have and none
of the bads it ought not have (and there are some goods it ought to have or some bads that
it ought not have).

DIVINE SATISFICING AND THE ETHICS OF THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

45

required to have sight but not omniscience.36 (Full goodness has natural
affinities with Aristotelian eudaimonia. They may be equivalent if both: a
life that achieves eudaimonia is qualitatively better than a life that falls just
short and some lives with eudaimonia can be better than others.)
For now, I ask that you assume the full details of medieval neo-Platonism. This will allow us to see that Murphy’s axiology leads to SR* rather
than his NRR. I’ll then argue that you should endorse the additional axiological structure presupposed by deprivation and full goodness, even if
you reject medieval neo-Platonism.
5. Medieval Neo-Platonism and Divine Reasons
At a bird’s eye view, my arguments for SR* amount to this: if you endorse
medieval neo-Platonism (or just the full goodness threshold), then the
normative-axiological fit criterion supports SR*. We can better understand
this argumentative strategy by considering some foils.
5.1. The Normative-Axiological Criterion and the Three Rivals
JRR is entailed by maximizing act utilitarianism (among other normative
theories), but even when folks abandon such views they retain JRR. To the
extent that there is any direct argument for JRR, it may be little more than
an application of the normative-axiological fit criterion. It seems that there
is requiring reason to make a life better than terrible and even better than
just barely good. If beyond the barely good there’s just varying degrees of even
better, then there is no qualitative axiological difference between the varying
degrees of betterness. Since there is an absence of qualitative axiological difference, there is an absence of qualitative normative difference (§3.2). In other
words, there is no principled axiological threshold to mark where requiring
reasons to promote well-being become merely justifying reasons to promote
well-being. And thus JRR is true: it must be requiring reasons all the way up.
The normative-axiological fit criterion might even make NRR seem attractive. On the relevant neo-Platonism, all goodness in the world is ultimately
God’s goodness and badness is ultimately explained in terms of God’s goodness. If you have an intuition that God has complete discretion over how his
goodness is exemplified in a creature’s life when the life is already great, it
may seem that there is no axiological joint, no qualitative difference between
the best life and the worst life. The creature just has more or less of God’s
goodness. And if there is no qualitative axiological difference, NRR must be
true: it must be merely justifying reasons all the way down.
JRR and NRR treat the normative significance of well-being in a uniform
manner: it is either requiring reasons all the way up (JRR) or merely justifying
36
It is, of course, a vexed question exactly what distinguishes those goods that are statistically correlated with human beings and those whose absence counts as deprivation. I don’t
have a good answer to this question, but there is a distinction here and we do take ourselves
to be able to tell the difference in at least some cases. We intuitively take the absence of sight,
to be a deprivation, and not a mere exception to a statistical regularity.
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reasons all the way down (NRR). Whether this normative uniformity is correct depends on how uniform axiological reality is. If medieval neo-Platonism is true, axiological reality has more structure (so less uniformity) than
is commonly recognized. There is a qualitative difference between the goods
that are axiologically required and those that aren’t, between the goodness a
thing ought to have and the goodness that goes beyond that point (§4.2). (The
above possible rationale for NRR misses the additional axiological structure
posited by neo-Platonism.) Recall that it is objectionably awkward to claim
that only persons have a special axiological status, dignity, and then deny
that persons are subject to any special normative treatment (§3.2). Likewise,
it is objectionably awkward to combine neo-Platonism’s qualitative axiological difference with JRR or NRR’s normative uniformity.
5.2. A Tale of Two Oughts
My two arguments for SR* are, in effect, just two different attempts to help
you see for yourself that the normative-axiological fit criterion supports
SR*, if we are assuming medieval neo-Platonism. These arguments exploit
two differences between goodness and badness, as they are understood
by neo-Platonism. The first argument exploits only the third component of
neo-Platonism. The second argument, which I develop in the next section,
exploits all three components.
The first difference between goodness and badness concerns a difference in impersonal ought claims. When a creature’s life is bad (in some
respect), its life ought to be better (in that respect). When a creature’s life
is already as good as it ought to be (in some respect), it’s false that the creature’s life ought to be better (in that respect).
Intuitively, there is a deep connection between impersonal ought to be
facts and personal ought to do facts.37 The nature of the connection will
depend on the sort of ought facts at issue. Here we are concerned with
ought to be facts which involve solely a creature’s well-being (in some
respect) and specifically with whether a creature’s life is deprived (in that
respect). This isn’t an all-in, or all things considered, ought to be fact. It is
a pro tanto one: insofar as the well-being of the creature is concerned, the creature’s life ought to be better. At most, then, we should expect this sort of
ought to be fact to ground a pro tanto ought to do fact.38
Cf. Feldman, Doing the Best We Can, 192. Feldman cannot find any way of linking ought
to be and ought to do that both is genuine and of “any crucial significance to normative
ethics” (Doing the Best We Can, 196). I’m going to show that neo-Platonism makes one way
of linking them significant enough for divine normative ethics that it vindicates the ethical
premise in the argument from evil.
38
I take this pro tanto ought to be to be internal to well-being and independent of whether
some suffering is deserved or demanded by justice. Just suffering is still deprivation. It may
be good that a villain suffer the badness of extreme pain, but the extreme pain is still bad, it
is still a deprivation. The possibility of just deprivation provides a potential way in which
an ought to be better insofar as the creature’s well-being is concerned might fail to be an all things
considered ought to be better.
37
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If an agent (all-in) ought to φ, then both it is rational for the agent
to φ and it is irrational for the agent to not φ. If an agent pro tanto
ought to φ, then both it is pro tanto rational for the agent to φ and it
is pro tanto irrational for the agent to not φ. Recall from §2 that only
requiring reasons are in the business of making things irrational. Thus,
both all-in and pro tanto ought to dos are grounded in requiring reasons. Requiring reasons ground pro tanto ought to dos whether or not
there are countervailing considerations. They ground all-in ought to
dos in the absence of countervailing considerations. I propose, therefore,
the following connection between the relevant sort of ought to be fact
and requiring reasons: if a creatures’s life ought to be better (in some
respect), then God has a requiring reason to make that creature’s life
better (in that respect).
Our dialectical context needs to be kept in mind. We are assuming that
creaturely well-being provides God with reasons to promote well-being. The debate is about what structure those reasons have. NRR, JRR,
and SR are rival accounts of this structure. If axiological reality were
as uniform as it is ordinarily taken to be, then JRR or NRR would fare
better on the normative-axiological criterion than SR*. For SR* would
draw qualitative normative distinctions in the absence of qualitative
axiological distinctions. Yet we are (provisionally) assuming neo-Platonism. We are assuming that axiological reality is divided between the
goods that a creature ought to have and those it’s false that the creature
ought to have. Only SR* has a normative structure that matches this
axiological divide.
The normative uniformity of JRR and NRR leads them to treat different
cases similarly, and this commits them to awkward conjunctions. These
awkward conjunctions call out for explanation. JRR holds that, insofar as
the well-being of the creature is concerned, God ought to make a creature’s life better even if it’s false that the creature’s life ought to be better. But why should concern for a creature pro tanto require God to make
the creature’s life better, when the creature’s life is already as good as it
ought to be? NRR says that, insofar as the well-being of the creature is
concerned, it’s false that God ought to make a creature’s life better even if
it’s true that the creature’s life ought to be better. But why shouldn’t a creature’s life pro tanto require God to make the creature’s life better when the
life isn’t as good as it ought to be? The problem for JRR and NRR is that
we expect qualitative axiological difference to correlate with qualitative
normative difference.
In contrast, SR* says that God has requiring reason to make a creature’s
life better exactly when the creature’s life ought to be better. That’s satisfying; it doesn’t call out for explanation in the way that JRR and NRR’s awkward conjunctions do. We expect there to be a deep connection between
the relevant sort of ought to be facts and God’s requiring reasons. Only
SR* vindicates this expectation. Only SR* has a normative structure that
matches neo-Platonism’s axiological structure.
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6. Participated Goodness and What a Life is Due
The second difference between goodness and badness, as they are understood by neo-Platonism, concerns their relation to the goodness that’s due.
Our neo-Platonic metaphysics posits an asymmetry between creaturely
goodness and badness. Taken together, the three parts of neo-Platonism
claim that the goodness and badness of a creature’s life are to be understood in relation to God. For a creature’s life to be fully good is for it to
manifest God’s goodness in every way that’s due to it, for the life to lack
nothing. For a creature’s life to be bad is for it to not manifest God’s goodness in ways that are due to it.
This asymmetry yields two different kinds of choices. If God is choosing
between a partly bad life and a fully good life, God is choosing between a
life that is deprived (of manifesting God’s goodness in ways that are due
to it) and one that isn’t deprived. If God is choosing between a fully good
life and an even better one, God is choosing how to manifest God’s own
goodness in the creature’s life beyond what’s due to the creature and when
the creature’s life is already lacking in nothing. I suggest that SR* best captures the normative significance of this difference.39
NRR and JRR again have awkward commitments that call out for
explanation. NRR holds that the prospect of manifesting more goodness
in the creature’s life never provides a requiring reason to manifest more of
God’s goodness in the creature’s life. Consequently, even if the creature is
due to manifest more of God’s goodness, God still has no requiring reason
to make the creature’s life better. But why is God’s manifestation of God’s
goodness in a creature’s life totally unconstrained when a creature isn’t
getting what they are due?
JRR holds that the prospect of manifesting more of God’s goodness
in a creature’s life always provides a requiring reason to manifest more.
Consequently, if a creature’s life is already lacking in nothing and already
manifests God’s goodness in every way that is due to it, JRR holds that
God still has requiring reason to manifest more of God’s own goodness.
But once a creature has everything it’s due, once it lacks nothing, why is
God further constrained in how God manifests God’s own goodness in the
creature’s life?
Again, the problem with JRR and NRR is that we expect qualitative axiological difference to correlate with qualitative normative difference. SR*
provides the expected correlation. God has requiring reason to manifest
more of God’s goodness in a creature’s life exactly when the creature is
due to manifest more of God’s goodness in the creature’s life. That’s satisfying and doesn’t call out for explanation.
NRR and JRR do have one trick up their sleeve. They might try to
capture the asymmetry between neo-Platonic goodness and badness in
39
Murphy (God’s Own Ethics, 80–81) appeals to the participated nature of creaturely goodness in his defense of NRR; however, we’ll see that NRR ignores the difference between these
two kinds of choices.
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a purely quantitative way. For example, the proponent of JRR might say
that while the prospect of a better life always has requiring strength, it has
precipitously less requiring strength when the life is already good, when it
already lacks nothing. The problem is that SR* gives us an even tighter fit
between our normative and axiological theories. The difference between
a creature’s life being due more and it’s lacking nothing is a qualitative difference (§4.2). The same goes for the difference between its being true that a
life ought to be better and its being false that it ought to be better. A normative
ethical theory fits better with neo-Platonism to the extent that it matches
these qualitative differences at the axiological level with qualitative differences at the normative one. Only SR* provides such a tight fit.40,41
7. Full Goodness without Neo-Platonism
The Two Oughts Argument (§5) and Due Goodness Argument (§6) are similar.
They both rely on the third component of medieval neo-Platonism and
thereby posit an axiological difference: there are certain amounts of goods
(pleasure, power, intelligence) that a creature ought to have or that are due
to the creature, and there are amounts of these goods that go beyond what
the creature ought to have or what it is due. In other words, there is a
qualitative difference between a life that is fully good and a life that is
deprived. And they both reveal that only SR* cuts the normative joints
where the axiological ones are.
Yet the two arguments are not redundant. Between them, they show
that there are two equally natural ways of speaking (ought vs due) that
have exactly the same normative implications.42 This strengthens the case
that there is an underlying reality directing our intuitions rather than that
40
JRR and NRR might imitate SR*’s normative implications with the help of countervailing
considerations. For example, let NRR+ be the conjunction of NRR with the claim that the creature has all the good it ought to have counts as a countervailing reason against giving the creature
more. If that’s the way you want to roll, feel free. Such a view will share SR*’s key implications
for atheistic arguments: it vindicates the key assumption of the problem of evil and undermines any assumption that God would choose the best. But why bother with the extra complication of countervailing considerations when SR* can do the same work without them?
41
Do my arguments in §§5–6 work equally well as arguments that human ethics has a
satisficing structure? Probably not as well. We might expect God to have a unique role in
ensuring that things are the way they ought to be and unique discretion concerning how to
manifest God’s own goodness. But if they do work equally well with respect to human ethics, then no problem. The methodological constraint prohibits beginning with the assumption
that human and divine ethics are analogous; it doesn’t prohibit ending up there.
42
The two arguments exploit the different connotations of “ought” and “due.” The Two
Oughts Argument exploits the natural thought that impersonal and personal oughts have
some deep connection. The Due Goodness Argument (especially what I will shortly call the
“increased oddness” of JRR) exploits intuitions one might have about what one person, God,
owes to another. If you reject medieval neo-Platonism, I suggest that you focus on the Two
Oughts Argument as it is the one that is most deeply connected to my own thinking and it
doesn’t rely on the first two parts of neo-Platonism. Even so, the Due Good Argument is
more directly a response to Murphy’s thinking, and so it plays a useful dialectical role not
played by my preferred argument.
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we are being bamboozled by our own words. Furthermore, only the Due
Goodness Argument relies on the first two parts of medieval neo-Platonism, which allows it to increase the oddness of JRR. Given all three
components, JRR constrains what God does with God’s own goodness when
everything else has what it is due and is lacking in nothing.
The third part of neo-Platonism is separable from the first two. Nothing is
particularly theistic or Platonic about the claim that badness (for a creature) is
deprivation. A naturalistic Aristotelian approach could accept that badness
for a creature is deprivation of the goods a creature ought to have. So could
a non-theistic non-naturalism about ethics, especially one that allows kind
membership to play important normative roles.43 Thus, there is some reason
to expect that my arguments for SR* can stand without relying on theistic,
neo-Platonic approaches to axiology. Of course, even if other metaethical
frameworks can make room for the full goodness threshold, it doesn’t follow that we should make room for it. If we don’t already endorse medieval
neo-Platonism, why should we take the full goodness threshold seriously?
To say that full goodness exists for some creature is to say that there are
some goods that the creature is due or that it ought to have. To see the plausibility of this claim, consider Singleton, a human whose life has one unit
of pleasure and no units of pain. Intuitively, that’s a very bad human life.
Indeed, it seems to be a very bad life with respect to pleasure and pain. Without
appealing to full goodness, it is hard to explain these intuitive judgments.
Simple hedonism claims that intrinsic goodness in a life is just pleasure and
intrinsic badness is just pain, and that’s all there is to it. This view can explain
why Singleton’s life is only barely good (it has only one net unit of intrinsic
value). Yet it denies that the life contains any intrinsic badness; therefore, it
can’t explain how the life is (intrinsically) bad, nor how it is (intrinsically)
bad with respect to pleasure and pain.44 A simple objective list theorist may
point out that the life lacks friendships or whatever. But the lack of friendships cannot explain how a life can be bad with respect to pleasure and pain. The
full goodness threshold seems to capture our intuitive evaluation of that life:
it is a bad life precisely because human lives ought to have more pleasure.45
43
44

E.g., FitzPatrick, “The Value of Life and the Dignity of Human Persons.”
More formally, the inference is as follows:
1. Singleton’s life is bad in itself (bad with respect to Singleton’s pleasure and
pain) only if it has some intrinsic badness in it. [premise]
2. If simple hedonism is true, then Singleton’s life is bad in itself (bad with respect
to Singleton’s pleasure and pain) only if it has some pain. [definition of simple
hedonism]
3. Singleton’s life doesn’t have any pain in it. [stipulation of case]
4. Therefore, if simple hedonism is true, then Singleton’s life isn’t bad in itself (or
bad with respect to pleasure and pain).
5. But Singleton’s life is bad in itself (bad with respect to pleasure and pain).
6. Therefore, simple hedonism is false.

The full goodness threshold might also be helpful for cashing out welfare prioritarianism and/or noncomparative harming; however, I’ll have to explore these connections on
another occasion.
45
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Full goodness is a meta-axiological notion. It takes no stand on what
the direct contributors to well-being are. Maybe it is just pleasure/pain, in
which case hedonism can be salvaged by allowing that there are two ways
for a life to be bad in itself: having pain and not having all the pleasure it
ought to have. We could call such a view full goodness hedonism to contrast
it with simple hedonism. Or maybe the direct contributors are given by
some sort of objective or hybrid list (as I sometimes suppose for the sake
of illustrations). The proponent of the full goodness threshold is committed solely to the claim that some of the goods that contribute to well-being are goods that the creature ought to have or are due to the creature.46
Singleton’s life shows us that the full goodness threshold is plausible in its
own right. As a human being, it seems that there are certain amounts of
pleasure that we are due or ought to have and that we are deprived when
our pleasure falls short.
Recall that full goodness falls short of maximal goodness. We might
be due at least one unit of pleasure each moment, but we aren’t due a
trillion units each moment. It is this feature of full goodness that grounds
the above arguments for satisficing whether medieval neo-Platonism is
true or not. The only downside of taking full goodness out of medieval
neo-Platonism is that we lose the increased oddness of JRR that comes
with endorsing the first two parts of neo-Platonism (i.e., that JRR would
constrain what God does with God’s own goodness even when everything
else is lacking nothing and has everything it is due).
8. Full Goodness and the Good Enough
One worry about satisficing theories is that there is no adequate way to
specify what degree of the good is good enough, the threshold that determines when one’s requiring reasons to promote the good become merely
justifying reasons to promote the good.47 On the one hand, we want the
cut-off to be principled. It should track something qualitative. On the
other, we want the threshold to be “demanding enough”: it must be plausible that God has only merely justifying reasons to make one better off
than the proposed threshold. It is difficult to satisfy both criteria at once.
Consider a view that lets being good serve as the good enough: God
has requiring reason to make a life at least barely good and merely justifying reason to make it even better. The threshold seems principled. At
first glance, there seems to be a qualitative difference between a life that
is at least barely good and one that is not.48 Yet the threshold also seems
46
Note that the full goodness threshold is logically weaker than medieval neo-Platonism’s
third component: only the latter entails that all bads (for a creature) are privative. Also, please
remember the caveat from n. 35.
47
Cf. Rubio, “God Meets Satan’s Apple,” 3001.
48
I say “at first glance,” because the difference may not be qualitative if we take the full
goodness threshold seriously and assume that all bads are deprivations. A life that has almost
as much pleasure, intelligence, power, friendships, etc. as it is due will be deprived, so bad,
in each respect. Yet overall the life is still very good. Given a full goodness threshold and the
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insufficiently demanding. The Repugnant Conclusion seems repugnant
for this very reason. In the absence of countervailing considerations, God
must do more than ensure that people’s lives are at least barely worth living. Suppose instead that we let flourishing serve as the good enough. This
cut-off is arguably demanding enough, but it doesn’t seem principled. In
the abstract, the difference between one’s having a good life and one’s
having a flourishing life seems to be a difference of mere degree.
Satisficing Reasons* offers an account of the good enough that is both
principled and sufficiently demanding. It holds that God has requiring reason to ensure that each creature’s life is fully good (in every respect), but
only merely justifying reason to ensure that the creature’s life is even better
(in that respect). The full goodness threshold is principled, because there
is a qualitative difference between a life (or part’s) being deprived and its
having all the goodness it is due, all the goodness it ought to have (§4.2).
The full goodness threshold will also be plenty demanding. We aren’t
due omniscience, but maybe most of us are due more intelligence than we
actually have. We aren’t due infinite amounts of pleasure each moment,
but maybe we are often due more than we are getting. Imagine a human
whose whole life and every part lacks nothing: it has every bit of pleasure, intelligence, power, friendships, and accomplishments that it ought to
have. The worst fully good life is a pretty awesome life.
Proponents of JRR, of course, won’t find any threshold demanding enough,
short of the best that God can do. Their objection is to (divine) satisficing theory
as such. This is not the place for a complete defense of satisficing theory. I have
shown that, as long as divine satisficing theory isn’t ruled out, SR*’s full goodness threshold is both principled and demanding enough. This is an accomplishment, as no other candidate for the good enough clearly satisfies both criteria.49
assumption that all bads are deprivations, we don’t go from bad/deprived to barely good; we
go from bad/deprived to fully good. Within this framework, the barely good (or worth living) threshold might be nothing more than some “sufficiently large” drop below full goodness. So it may not be a qualitative threshold after all.
49
Consider an account of the good enough that we can call the uniformly good account: a life
is good enough when it is good overall and good at every moment in which it exists. At first
glance, this account seems to be an alternative to my full goodness account. Will this account
be demanding enough? Recall Singleton and let’s add that his one unit of pleasure happens in
the only moment he exists. Given simple hedonism, his life is good overall and good in each
moment, but his life doesn’t look good enough. So if the alternative account is demanding
enough, it either depends on an implicit commitment to full goodness or it appeals to some sort
of list view which holds that a human life has to be “long enough.” If it appeals to the latter, a
uniformly good life is still compatible with an awful lot of apparent deprivation. While the life
might be good overall and good in each moment, it could still be a life that lacks as much intelligence, pleasure, friendships, achievement, and so forth as it ought to have. To the extent that
the life seems deprived, I think we’ll feel some pressure to say that God should make the life
better and, thus, I worry that this account isn’t demanding enough. (Of course, a life with deprivation is bad and so a deprived life is not going to be uniformly good. But as was explained in
§4.2, the possibility of deprivation requires the possibility of full goodness, and so any appeal
to deprivation is implicitly committed to full goodness. To the extent that uniform goodness
requires the absence of deprivation, it is not an alternative to my full goodness account.)
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Before we return to the problem of evil, let me restate the big picture of
§§5–8. The full goodness threshold is worth taking seriously whether we
endorse medieval neo-Platonism or not. This threshold supports satisficing in two distinct ways. First, it grounds the essential elements of the Two
Oughts and Due Goodness arguments (but it does not, by itself, ground
the “increased oddness” of JRR). These arguments show that Satisficing
Reasons* is the normative theory that provides the tightest fit with the full
goodness threshold, and so it fares the best on the normative-axiological
fit criterion. Second, the notion of full goodness provides an account of
the good enough that is both principled and demanding enough to be
good enough, thereby resolving a long-standing problem with satisficing
theory.
9. SR* and the Ethics of the Problem of Evil
Satisficing Reasons* and Just Requiring Reasons have a common core: they
both vindicate the ethical premise in the argument from evil, namely that
God necessarily prevents suffering in the absence of sufficiently strong
countervailing considerations. When a creature suffers, it is not getting
as much good as it is due (or as much as God can give it) and so God
has requiring reason to make it better. Thus, God is rationally required
to prevent suffering—indeed, God is rationally required to make the life
fully good (or as well off as God can make it)—in the absence of countervailing considerations. Recall that, necessarily, God does what God has
undefeated requiring reason to do (§2). So SR* and JRR entail the relevant
premise, namely that God necessarily prevents a creature’s suffering in the
absence of countervailing considerations.
Pruss and Yancy argue that the third component of neo-Platonism—the
claim that all badness is privative—would severely weaken the problem
of evil.50 Their argument assumes that privative evils do not significantly
detract from one’s well-being. The assumption probably holds for the
privative evils they focused on. Yet pain and low amounts of pleasure
can significantly detract from one’s well-being, and the privative view can
easily explain why (§4 and §7). Pain and low amounts of pleasure drive
powerful problems of evil even if they are privative. The privative view,
then, does not weaken the problem of evil. Rather, the privative view—
and more generally, the full goodness threshold—vindicates the ethical
premise in the problem of evil.
Murphy protests that the key ethical premise conflicts with God’s
sovereignty:
The idea that the absolutely perfect being could be made to act by some
creature as final cause is as contrary to that being’s sovereignty as the idea
that the absolutely perfect being could be made to act by some creature as
efficient cause.51
50
51

Pruss and Yancy, “Privation in the Problem of Evil.”
Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 79.
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Following rather traditional Anselmian metaphysics, Murphy assumes
that an absolutely perfect being’s (in)action can’t ultimately be explained
in terms of something external to it. For example, an absolutely perfect
being can’t be coerced or efficiently caused into action by something bigger
and stronger than it. If the well-being of creatures plays a role in explaining why God must (not) do certain things, Murphy worries that God’s (in)
action will ultimately be explained in terms of something external to God.
Murphy’s argument endorses a very strong conception of sovereignty,
one that I’m not sure I endorse. Here I’ll limit my response to showing that
Murphy’s neo-Platonic metaphysics addresses his own worry. Suppose
that God has requiring reason to prevent suffering. Presumably, suffering
contributes to such a reason only insofar as the suffering is bad. Given the
relevant neo-Platonic metaphysics, creaturely badness is to be ultimately
explained in relation to God (albeit in a more complicated way than goodness is to be explained in relation to God). The reason-giving power of suffering, whatever it happens to be, is ultimately grounded in God’s value.
For God to be moved by the badness of human suffering is for God to be
moved by God’s own goodness. In short, sovereignty considerations do
not support NRR over its competitors, SR and JRR, and so do not challenge the ethical premise in the argument from evil.52
Conclusion
Once a satisficing structure is clearly distinguished from what I called the
JRR Conjunction, it seems that no one has previously argued that divine
ethics has a satisficing structure. Nonetheless, I’ve argued that divine ethics has a particular satisficing structure, SR*: God has requiring reason
to make a creature’s life and every part of it fully good, but only merely
justifying reasons to make it even better. I relied on two applications of
the normative-axiological fit criterion. First, only SR* respects an intuitive connection between whether a creature’s life ought to be better and
whether God ought to make it better. Second, only SR* respects the difference between a life that lacks manifesting goods in ways that are due to it
and a life that lacks nothing.
The full goodness threshold emerged as an important contribution
for both satisficing theory and meta-axiology. For satisficing theory, it
grounded the arguments for divine satisficing and resolved the longstanding worry that there is no account of the good enough that is both
52
Furthermore, if this sovereignty objection were correct, it would rule out Murphy’s
plausible position that God has (decisive) requiring reason not to intend suffering. Murphy
(God’s Own Ethics, ch. 5, sec 5.6) considers this further worry. His response assumes that
God’s reason to not intend suffering is grounded solely in God’s holiness, which is wholly
internal to God’s nature in a way that our suffering isn’t. I contend, however, that any such
reason would also be grounded in suffering’s being bad. Think of how lame it would be to
say, “God can’t intend bad things, but that literally has nothing to do with the things’s being
bad.” If divine sovereignty rules out God’s having requiring reason to promote our well-being, it also rules out God’s having (decisive) requiring reason to not intend our suffering.
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principled and demanding enough to be good enough. For meta-axiology, it explains how a life with only pleasure and no pain can be bad with
respect to pleasure and pain.
My defense of SR* also meets Murphy’s challenge to the ethical premise in the argument from evil, the claim that God has requiring reason
to prevent suffering (or, that God must prevent suffering in the absence
of countervailing considerations). I showed that SR* vindicates the ethical premise in the argument from evil. Indeed, SR* vindicates the ethical
premise even if we grant Murphy’s neo-Platonic metaphysics and avoid
relying on the further, contested assumption that God shares our moral
reasons.53
William & Mary
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